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Irish national income in 1911 and its context 
The calculation I made many years ago of national incme in 1911 aqd 
which rounded up, gave a figure of £150 million, first quoted in 1977 , 
arose out of an interest in the relationship between foreign trade and 
income levels. The role of foreign trade in the Irish economy over 
several centuries could not be understood without some idea of 
incomes, and especially for the 19th century with its many wisps and 
straws of figures for income here and abroad, could not be understood 
without some idea of what income actually was on the eve of the first 
world war. It was vital to have an estimate of clearly defined income 
which would not be an overestimate, and which would be the bench 
mark date for estimating the role of foreign trade at the end of the 
period. A figure of £131 million was arrived at from relatively 
accessible data for well-identified categories or from larger 
categories, with large deductions to eliminate doublecounting: a 
residue , if any, caused by doublecounting, should be counterbalanced 
by income that was overlooked, or that got loss within the handling of 
the data. A figure of £131 million was sufficient to eliminate some of 
the impossible scenarios that otherwise existed: an economy, whose 
foreign trade-orientation was not only high, but far beyond the level of 
other countries or, if the lower estimates of income, were accepted, a 
whirl-wind expansion during or after the first world war, one unknown 
to contemporaries (except modestly in the war-time inflation) and to 
historians. 
In other words with a figure of £131 million, one was close to a 
realistic estimate: it made sense of past development, and eliminated 
the problems inherent in calculations of foreign trade as a proportion 
of national income on the basis of comparing low estimates of pre-war 
income with better ones post-1922. For the purpose in hand at the 
time, this figure would itself have been sufficient, and hence it was 
never refined further in detail. Additions for price adjustments 
because of the use of 1907 and 1908 data (£5 million) and for 
omissions and evasion (£5 million) raised the figure very 
conservatively to £ 141 million, and the rise in volume between 1907 
or 1908 and 1911 was ignored with the purpose of creating a further 
inbuilt guard against overestimation. If one wished to calculate 
national income on its probable footing, the addition of £10 million 
seemed inadequate. At £141 million as well as at £141plus million , 
Irish income still seemed on the small side, unless the foreign trade 
data were to be regarded as an overestimate , a possibility which was 
for a number of reasons explicitly excluded. Ireland was still more 
foreii;in-trade oriented than other economies, and some crude 
considerations warranted regarding the figure as £150 million as a 
safe one for the outer parameters of income. 
Until recently long-term trends in relative income were little studied, 
and apart from the studies of Bairoch which confuse rather than help 
the issue because they juxtapose both reliable and incredible 
estimates are still rare.2 The historical starting point of such 
comparisons was the seminal one by Kuznets of U.S. incomes with those 
of European industrial countries.3 But even this was based on 
estimates which did not go back beyond 1844. This was largely due to 
the statistical deficiencies, already substantial for the second half of 
the nineteenth century, and perhaps insurmountable for preceding 
decades. Still any study of comparative income raised the question 
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whether Kuznets' conclusions could be paralleled for the same period 
from comparisons nearer home and also whether it was possible to 
push, however crudely , the r.rospects of study back beyond 1844. Even 
conclusions subject to qualification would help to confirm or qualify 
the validity and significance of conclusions drawn in comparisons 
between Britain and Ireland from the less speculative statistical data 
of the post-1844 period. Study of very loose estimates of Irish income (which are not discussed here as pre-1821 estimates belong to a world 
of heroic guess scholarship) with the scarcely better estimates for 
British income seemed to bear out the comparative long-term 
stability of relative per capita income levels inferred by Kuznets from 
the study of the growth of per capita incomes in the United States and 
other industria1 countries.4 Irish income was neither incredibly low, 
nor at any time exceptionally high. The study did however bear out the 
likelihood of substantial short-term swings, or cycles if you 
wish,which seemed plausible. In somewhat narrower contexts, 
longterm comparisons of incomes were possible, as in the case of 
wages between Ireland and Scotland. Moreover the gap between skilled 
and unskilled wage rates was relatively easy to study and relatively 
free from pitfalls, and the gaps within the range , or the contrasts 
with England or Scotland, proved surprizingly persistent.5 
I have to say however that in the aftermath of this work I encountered 
some reluctance among historians to concede that it was possible that 
Irish income could ever be as high as even half of English income. In a 
sense this is reflected in the possiblity which exists , using the 
Bairoch data, to suggest that lnsh incomes in the mid-nineteenth 
century were as low as incomes in eastern Europe or the Balkans.6 This 
dilemma is reflected in Mokyr's book in a rather striking way: on 
finding that his own estimates were rather higher than he expected, 
-about half British income - which was inconvenient for his ...argument, 
he proceeded to devise a curious definition of Irish income.7 Prof. 0 
Grada more recently refers to the gap as a huge one,8 and at the outer 
reaches of credibility many years ago occurred Hobsbawm's absurd 
comment on " eight and a half million Irishmen impoverished beyond 
belief". 9 
The conclusion drawn from a study of Irish conditions seemed to widen 
the applicability of Kuznets' statement and supported the inference 
that disparities between agricultural and industrial countries may be 
of IOnQ standing just as the disparities between the United States and 
industrial countries may have preceded modern industrialisation. In the 
case of Ireland, the rate of increase of income in the long term may 
have been as rapid or more rapid than in neighbouring Britain despite 
the relative failure of industrialisation in Ireland. The Irish case thus 
appeared to bear out for a labour-surplus low-wage economy in 
contrast to the labour-shortage, high-cost United States economy, the 
truth of Kuznets' proposition. This conclusion, was also at first sight 
unexpected, because it seemed to confirm from a less promising 
instance, that industrialisation did not create or widen disparities and 
that the explanation of the existing disparities must rest on factors 
other than the obvious but apparently deceptive one of relative success 
or failure in industrialisation. 
The long-term character of disparities in per capita incomes is, of 
course, subject to qualification. For one thing disparities have 
narrowed or widenend significantly in the short-term, almost in a 
cyclical fashion. More importantly, over time some striking reversals 
have taken place, because some of the gains made in the shorter term 
have proved permanent. This is obvious not only between countries, but 
between regions and classes in the same country. Clearly existing 
disparities can widen, otherwise, against all expectations, 
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industrialisation would have left the existing relationships in terms of 
per capita income unchanged · a situation which as a general 
proposition would be in conflict both with theory and empirical 
experience. However with the deindustrialisation of the cradle 
districts of the classical industrial revolution we are now painfully 
aware both that districts can deindustrialise, and how their 
accumulated inheritance from centuries of economic activity has been 
disconcertingly small. In so far as they were rich , they were 
successful in tandem with metropolitam centres, and centuries of 
successful performance created little local infrastructure or skills 
outside a narrow base. We need in fact as we reach the end of the 
industrial patterns created by the original Industrial Revolution to 
rephrase many of the propositions of classical economics and of 
economic history: it is abundantly clear that the major areas of growth 
now centre on larger metropolitan districts and to a lesser extent on 
subdistricts, often artificially favoured by regional policy, playing the 
same role within large societies. Industrialisation or, the other side of 
the same coin, deindustrialisation, however is less likely to sharpen 
income disparities when factors of production are in elastic supply and 
when mobility is perfect. The widening of disparities implies less than 
perfect competition, less than perfect mobility inwards or outwards, 
and a partly closed regional or world economic system; undoubtedly 
mobility was comparatively limited for much of the period covered by 
modern industrialisation, and the indigenous populations of now 
-decaying districts are proving less than mobile outwards (at least in 
periods of weak general economic growth) or into new skills. This 
question is, therefore, even in its fundamentals, tied up with the world 
system, and it is difficult to understand the basis for disparities, 
their character and either their persistence or in some instance their 
melting away without bearing in mind the role of foreign trade and 
migration. 
II 
Recent compilations of income estimates, while intended to illuminate 
economic performance, have often confused the issue. Bairoch's data 
suggest some curious or improbable convergences in mid-nineteenth 
century Europe, which give eastern Europe a high place, and 
Scandinavia a comparatively low one. The estimates also give England 
a clear leadership. Yet the problems lie at times less in contrasting 
performance than in the estimates themselves. Given extensive 
industrialisation, a highly inegalitarian distribution of income, a large 
wage-labour force and an early and highly developed direct income tax, 
English • or British - data were or are by definition easy to calculate. 
Everywhere estimates of agriculture tend to be realistic or relatively 
so, because they rely on good estimates of aggregate production; 
estimates for industry and services are variable, heterogeneous, and 
even arbitrary ,and on balance are likely to omit or underestimate 
income. We are faced with the paradox that precisely because the 
performance of agriculture - closely monitored for statistical 
purposes, even from the eighteenth century in some instances · makes 
1t posssible to calculate income from relatively good and 
comprehensive data for physical output, agriculture is the least 
uncertain component of income, far ahead of the "more advanced" 
sectors of industry and services. Thus in the case of France the curious 
equality of income between agriculture and other areas, commented on 
by Beflerby for instance 1 0, was simply a reflection of the deficiencies 
of data. Hence the gaps in income between countries are not real ones, 
but apparent ones between accurately enough recorded data for 
England, and less well recorded data for other countries. In other 
words Britain's relative leadership is somewhat less overstated, and 
the advance of other countries over time less dramatic. These 
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considerations have been borne out in interesting analyses such as 
those of relative incomes as varied as Japan and France. Thus Susan 
Hanley has suggested that income in Japan in 1868 at the outset of the 
Meiji advance was little below income in England a century previously 
on the eve of its industrialisation. 11 O'Brien and Keyder have found a 
sizeable difference between agricultural and industrial incomes in 
France, and aggregate incomes much closer to British than assumed in 
the earlier literature.1 2 
Ireland's historical experience before 1914 was closely tied to foreign 
trade; more recently its poor economic performance between 1929 and 
1958 was related closely to the problems whic were more acutely 
evident in world trade than in world rroduction, and post-1958 
growth has to be related to an expansion o the country's foreign trade 
m volume. Historically, the growth of Irish foreign trade was 
remarkably raf id through both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
By the end o the nineteenth century exports accounted for between 30 
and 40 per cent of gross national product, per capita special exports 
were larger than Britain's and not much below the level of the 
Netherlands and Belgium. The Irish experience cannot be divorced from 
another factor, mobility of population. Irish migration in the second 
half of the nineteenth century exceeded the natural increase of 
population. Proportionately, Irish migration was larger than that from 
Scotland and Norway. It would be fess unique if we sought parallels 
outside the period. The special case of Berlin and more appositely 
Portugal in recent decades have offered parallels. 
That Irish experience, if not in its short-term cyclic movements or its 
almost unique migration, was in point of income in the long-term 
favourable in a comparative sense, has not been the generally accepted 
view. In fact, the lack of comparative income data did not prevent the 
formulation of assumptions as a matter of course that Irish income fell 
progressively behind incomes in industrialising countries. Deane and 
Cole argued by implication, three decades ago, that Irish per capita 
incomes 
1 
r
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ose less than English per capita incomes in the nineteenth 
century , and they maintained the same view for the eighteenth 
century: "Certainly it would be difficult to find evidence for an 
accelaration of this order in Ireland which by the end of the eighteenth 
century is estimated to have accounted for about a third of the 
population of the United Kingdom (sic)."14 Their conclusion was that if 
their estimates for Eng 1 and and Wales were extended "to include 
Scotland and Ireland, it may be supposed that the 18th century rate of 
growth would seem lower". 15 The confident reference even to Scotland 
reflects the unquestioning arrogance of England-centred-ness. 
This argument was also put forward as part of the hypothesis advanced 
in what appeared to be a very persuasive article by Professor Butlin in 
the ensuing debate on the subject of English economic growth in 
percentage terms. Professor Butlin's articfe was directed towards 
arguing that England's lagging rate of growth was due in part to the 
United Kingdom's estimates being dragged down by the poor 
performance of lreland.1 6 If Ireland should be excluded, England's 
performance would appear less dismal in international comparison. 
This approach was based in effect on comparisons between an estimate 
of Irish national income for 1911 which must, on examination be 
reyarded as comparativelv. low and an estimate for 1851 which is 
probably true to the mark.l 7 Professor Butlin also speculated that it is 
possible that per capita Irish real wage incomes in 1851 bore a closer 
relation - some 8three quarters - to the British level than they did half a century later. 1 If so, Irish incomes would have risen very sluggishly 
in per capita terms, and the exclusion of Ireland would produce a 
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higher rate of growth of per capita incomes for the rest of the United 
Kingdom. Indeed, it is possible that total Irish income in Professor 
Butnn's account, fell in absolute terms between 1855 and 1911: this 
possibility is suggested by providing for "a shortlived recovery" 
between 1851 and 1855 which would temDorarily have boosted 
aggregate incomes above the 1851 level. 1 9 If Professor Butlin's 
su9gestions should be close to the mark, the exclusion of Ireland from 
United Kingdom estimates would have the effect of both boosting per 
capita figures by excluding a territorial enti? characterised by a 
shrinking income even in aggregate terms, an the residual gross 
aggregate for the United Kingdom less lreland.2 
Professor Butlin's estimates, while obviously convenient from the 
point of view of the hypothesis he put forward, raised considerable 
difficulties. Not only was Professor Butlin's short-lived recovery in the 
early 1850s, necessary to sustain the more extreme possibility of a 
declining aggregate income distinctly awkward to relate to the facts of 
Irish economic history, but by firmly excluding the possibility of 
qualitative improvement in the structure of nonagricultural 
employment, he weakened even the broader basis of his arguments: 
If this approximates historical experience, Irish gross domestic 
product per head cannot have risen as fast as that of England, 
Scotland and Wales, given the importance of the agricultural 
workforce throughout, unless there was a much greater 
transformation of the non-agricultural sector. The tendency of 
the workforce in manufacturing, trade, building and transport to 
dwindle at much the same rate as that in agriculture, does not 
lend strong support to this condition. 21 
While for Professor Butlin, the relatively unchanged share of the 
workforce in the complex of manufacturing, building, transport and trade 
proved I re land "substantially unresponsive to modernisation and 
structural change occurring in the rest of the United Kingdom", 22 it is 
precisely this deceptive stability that makes crucial the assessment ot 
the qualitative change. Feinstein made an assumption similar to Butlin's: 
arriving by careful estimation at an Irish residual amounting to 6 per 
cent of the United Kingdom gross domestic product in 1907, average Irish 
real product in previous periods, total and per capita, was then 
calculated on the assumption that marked changes in re.lative labour 
productivity were "in general .... not likely to have occurred" .2 3 
The likelihood of a qualitative improvement in the structure, however, 
seems highly likely where population is declining in the circumstances 
of the second half of the century: moreover Butlin seemed to 
underestimate both the quantitative growth in areas within the tertiary 
sector and qualitative growth in the secondary and tertiary sectors taken 
as a whole. In fact, unintentionally he found himself, as an economist, 
curiously allied to those among nationalist contemporaries who, aware of 
the growing tertiary sector, challenged its productivity and like T. Lough 
in 1896 decried it:'"Thus a larger percentage of the people describe 
themselves as dealers - those who live by buying and sellilng ... none of 
those classes are wealth producers".24 
It is possible, of course, to argue that the undoubted rise in Irish living 
standards was a once for all rise in the immediate aftermath of famine 
mortality in the late 1840s and massive emigration in the early 1850s. 
This is unlikely in practice. Even if agricultural wages, the lowest wage 
category in Ireland, are taken, wages not only rose in the early 1850s, but 
even between 1860 and 1896, rose more sharply than they did in England 
and Wales, both over the thirty-six year period as a whole and in each 
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successive decade within the period.25 In another source, an official one, 
the wages of agricultural labouress rose more rapidly in Ireland than in 
Britain between 1880 and 1907.26 If allowance is made for the decline 
in underemployment in the industrial and commercial sectors and a 
significant qualitative improvement - both likely consequences of the 
large and continuin9 shakeout in employment - the likelihood of a sharp 
ana continuing rise in per capita money wages is overwhelming. 
Ill 
Estimates of Irish income, both contemporary and later, all erred on the 
side of being too low. It is true, of course, that Irish nationalists had a 
vested interest in seizing on low estimates. Lough, for instance, quoting 
a national income estimate of £70 million,.. thought that "this amount 
cannot err on the side of being too low" .t:. 7 But in fact, most of the 
estimates of Irish income were British. Sir Robert Giffen in 1886 
estimated Irish income at £70 million, thinking that his calculations 
gave "too little to Great Britain if not too much to Ireland. "28 Before the 
First Financial Relations Commission, he put Irish natipnal income "at 
some point" between £63 million and £76 million.29 Leoni Levi's 
estimate of Irish income in 1882/3 (quoted before the same 
Commission) was £85 1/2 million. 30 Another
3
estimate of the period 
appears to be that by Mulhall, £92 million in 1895. 1 Crammond, in the 
culminating phase of this writing put income at a level of around £85 
million, and provided _per capita figures of £36 and £19 for Scotland and 
Ireland respectively. 32 
Later estimates are not much happier. Arthur Bowley estimated the 
income of the area corresponding to the Irish Free State as 4 per cent. of 
the United Kingdom home national income or £76 million in 1911.33 If 
one should assume that per capita incomes in Northern Ireland were the 
same as southern incomes,34 the all-Ireland figure for 1911 would be 
approximately £110 million.35 More recent estimates, relating to the 
same period, also result in relatively low figures. Emmet Larkin's 
calculations, for instance result in a figure of £82 million for 1901 (a 
figure which served to greatly enhance the relative importance of 
"unproductive" church expenditure which he was writing about). 36 More 
recently Garvin was scathing in his review of Lee's book, where Lee had 
accepted the estimate of £150 million for 1911, a stance adoptly less 
stridently by Fitzpatrick in another review.37 
It was not feasible to arrive at estimates for Ireland as a residual by 
subtracting estimates for Great Britain from estimates for the United 
Kingdom. 31:l As Bullin stated in relation to United Kingdom estimates 
and those for Great Britain calculated by Deane and Cole, "the two 
estimates differ by much more than the inclusion and exclusion of 
Ireland". 39 The fluctuating level and erratic trend of Irish income 
derived from them would amply bear out that contention. Deane and Cole 
also created United Kingdom figures based on their Great Britain 
calculations, but while useful from the standpoint of studying British 
conditions because the margin of error would affect the greater whole 
relatively little; "a crude estimate of the net product of Ireland based on 
assumed average income per head"40 is too arbitrary for useful study of 
the Irish entity. The nearest approach to a separate calculation was 
Feinstein's calculation of the Irish residual of the components of British 
gross domestic product for 1907. The gross domestic product of the 
United Kingdom according to Feinstein's calculation in 1907 was £2,156 
million at market prices and the Irish component estimated at 6 per cent 
would be £129 million. Applied to Feinstein's United Kingdom gross 
domestic product of £2,316 million in 1911, the 6 % fraction would give 
an Irish figure of £139 million.41 Professor Feinstein pointed out that it 
did not take into acccount components of Irish income that might be 
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included in an independent calculation and that in calculating the 
residual the Irish element, the smaller one of the components, the margin 
of error is potentially much greater than for the British constituent. 
However, the estimate is an interesting one, higher than existing ones, 
and at least one level off the range of incomes of the Irish economy at 
this time. 
IV 
The estimate for Ireland for 1911, which is the subject of this paper, 
was based on the censuses of industrial and agricultural production, 
1907 and 1908 respectively, income tax assessments, and wage and 
salary rates applied to categories in the decennial census of population, 
duly adjusted where figures from the industrial census, tax data, and 
official figures for incomes in the public sector were available. The 
main problem in using the data is the need to make allowances to avoid 
doublecounting. The key difficulty lies in eliminating doublecounting in 
estimating non-agricultural income, a problem which is greatly 
exacerbated by the failure of the Census of Industrial Output for 1907 
unlike later censuses to distinguish between wages and salaries, and 
also by the problem of identifyingly unambiguously in the 1911 
population census the groups covered by the 1907 Census of Industrial 
Output. Unemployment and underemployment could perhaps be regarded as 
a problem also: however to the extent that eliminations were generous 
and income estimates cautious or ungenerous, this problem has itself 
been either eliminated or moderated. In addition the 1911 census returns 
of 804,850 males without occupation includes some 70,000 males of 20 
years and upwards and below 65. It is hard to see all these as having no 
income or maintenance which would warrant classification as an income. 
I have treated this category as covering part of the underemployment / 
unemployment factor .. In so far as their income has been overlooked, it 
compensates, in conjuction with cautious figures for earnings, for 
underestimation or unemployment/ underemployment elsewhere. 
As presented in the Appendix the estimate is largely unchanged. The key 
calculations are left untouched , and some additional adjustments have 
been made only for some of the final stages of processing of the 
subtotals. To do otherwise, at twenty years remove, to the original 
worksheets would be unwise without a long process of refamiliarisation 
with the detail: error could be compounded, small income categories 
added in a second time, or more probably doubly eliminated. However, 
deductions have been increased further, and some new conceptual 
refinements have warranted a series of relatively small pluses and 
minuses. One change noted as being necessary even in putting the final 
round of the original figures together , has still not been carried out. 
Some income assessments were on a current income basis( most , though 
not all, schedule E income), others on a preceding year basis (most 
importantly schedule D). Hence, assessments for the year ended March 
1912 related to income earned in the year to March 1911, and are the 
figures used in the calculations. This covers one quarter of the calendar 
year 1911, but it would be preferable to use assessments issued for the 
year ended March 1913. For reasons of time, this change noted as 
desirable at the time of the original calculation still has to be 
undertaken, though for the year 1911 itself the consequences are small. 
A wiser man twenty years later, if I were doing the exercise afresh, I 
would take the income tax figures, and use the 1907 industrial census 
sparingly for isolated purposes rather than general ones. In other words, 
the tax assessments would be used more centrally and after some 
suitable elimination of individual taxpapers and one-man taxpaying 
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firms, income would be calculated primarily by multiplying whole 
sectors of census-returned figures by estimates of wage rates or 
earnings. The incomes of larger firms would also be caught in this 
fashion automatically without the need to make further adjustments 
(except separately and at a later stage in the exercise for avoidance and 
evasion). This would reduce the amount of eliminating necessary and in 
consequence avoid much of the complexity of simultaneously using 
income tax, census and other data in a closely overlapping way which 
extends the somewhat ambiguous process of eliminating-procedures 
with its inherent, though mutually cancelling dangers of doublecounting 
and double elimination. Moreover, comparisons between categories within 
the 1907 census, as also with later censuses raise questions about the 
reliability of the data. As a result of experience of using the data twenty 
years ago and reflection since then, I would now venture the personal 
opinion that the Census of Industrial Output for 1907 should not be used. 
Rough calculations, created by taking agricultural income, income tax 
returns, public sector incomes, and the retention of existing or revised 
computations for other categories, and the addition of a figure for the 
balance of income earners in the 1911 census of population given 
arbitrarily an income £75 a year each (pitched at that level to take 
account of profits as well as wages) would give a not very different 
result. 
The likelihood of a higher figure than £141million for 1911 seems 
implied in the fact that such a figure leads to an unduly high share for 
agricultural income for a country at Ireland's state of development. One 
of the few certainties of Irish income is that per capita agricultural 
incomes were about half those of Scotland or England. On the other 
hand, industrial incomes were closer together, a fact reflected in per 
capita net output of £102, £98 and £78 for England, Soctland and Ireland 
respectively in the 1907 Census of Industrial Output. The fact that £142 
million seems a low estimate is reinforced by the fact that £67 million 
for exports in 1911 results in a figue of almost 50 per cent for exports 
expressed as a percentage of GNP. This seems unacceptably high except 
for a small enclave economy or for a district within an economy, and is 
hard to accept for Ireland. A figure of £150 million in 1911, giving a 
percentage net agricultural income of 33 % and an export proportion of 
43 % of G.N.P.,is inherently more probable. An export trade accouting for 
43 per cent of GNP still seems high and suggests that G.N.P. may nave 
slightly exceeded £150 million. This figure, if correct, would reinforce 
the extent to which Irish incomes contracted in 1920s, and is somewhat 
more probable, though the whole question remains speculative, and will 
be best attested ultimately not by juggling with figures but by some 
serious study of living standares as measured by life styles and the 
availability or use of consumer goods. 42 
A crude cross check is possible from the calculation by Kiernan of the 
National Income of the Free State for 1926. Kiernan's calculation is £164 
million . If Northern Ireland income were assumed to be a half of this 
(which gives northern income a generous margin above southern income), 
the total Irish income in 1926 would have been £247 million. If the 
1926 estimate was deflated by the rise in retail of prices of 78%),4 J 
it would give a total income for 1911 of £139 million .. Of course, if 
there had been a growth in volume in the interval, the income in 1911 
would have been lower. A comparison of pre-war exports from Ireland 
with post-war exports and of the 1908 Census of Agricultural output 
with the 1925 and 1926 censuses of Northern Ireland and the Irish Free 
State respectively suggest stagnation in volume and even decline.4 4 
Linen exports from the United Kingdom (mainly from Northern Ireland) had 
contracted sharply, and this is confirmed more directly in the export data 
for the 1912 and 1925 censuses of industrial output; the boominr:J ship 
building had waned (even if Belfast with its liner specialisation in the 
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great decade of the Ocean Queens fared better than other U.K. yards). The 
static nature of the trends is reinforced if we make the 1912 
agricultural output census the basis for the income calculations rather 
than the 1908 census: it would automatically embrace the rise in prices 
which I allowed for elsewhere within an adjustment addition, and a rise 
in volume which I did not allow for. Its figure is £59 million for gross 
output compared with £45 million for 1908, and converted for national 
income accounting on the basis employed in this paper, including turf and 
imputed income and net of rent remitted to absentees, would amount to 
£64.2 million, compared with £50.54 million. 
V 
Three features of Irish trade which are important to bear in mind are: (i) 
the growth in trade in the nineteenth century, (ii) the emergence of a 
deficit in the balance of trade financed by an invisibles surplus, (iii) the 
evidence , in structure at least, of a mature economy, with an invisibles 
surplus matching the commodity imbalance. These features are 
dynamically related. They can also be related to the changes in banking 
These are not only important in themselves and for the time of their 
emergence, c.1875, but also in interpreting the structure of the economy 
in the 1920s. The proportions of the deficit in visible trade in the 1920s 
in the Irish Free State, larger than in 1911 for the whole island, could 
easily be interpreted as a consequence of increased imports consequent 
on the war-time rise in incomes and the enhanced investment income. 
However, the banking structure in the nineteenth century varied between 
north and south: northern banking was more closely geared to industrial 
investment with deposits close to bank advances; southern banking 
especially as it tapped rising rural incomes effectively with an 
enhanced branch network ( made even more effective with the advent of 
the sub-branch) from the 1870s onwards increasingly conformed to the 
typical agricultural pattern of deposits running well ahead of advances. 
Exports per capita from the Free State were almost £14 in 1926, 
compared with £14.8 in 1911 for the island . If it were assumed that 
exports from the south were of the order of almost £11 in 1911 (the 
£14 figure less 33 per cent inflation in the interval), they would have 
been of the order of £ 34.5 million in 1911. In other words the balance -
exports from the north (£30.7 million) - would have been roughly £25 per 
head compared with the national figure of £14.8 in 1911. In turn , if the 
income of the north was of the order of, say, £50 million, the 
percentage of export trade to income would have been about 65 per cent, 
or if income were £45 million (assuming that it was strictly 
proportionate to population , which would maximise the proportion) , 1t 
would have been 73 per cent. These considerations suggest that income 
has to be in the region of £150 million : otherwise exports become too 
high a proportion of the income of the island, or the enclave 
characteristic of the north becomes impossibly high. A figure of 43% is 
not too far out line. If we put trade at a proportion of not less than 50 
percent for the island as Prof. 0 Grada suggests, the proportion of 
exports in the case of the north must have nsen to an extremely high 
level, and one higher than its own only modestly advanced level of 
industrialisation would warrant. 
If imports are looked at , the figures seem to match. Imports per capita 
were £20.4 in the Free State in 1926, compared with a national figure 
of £15.2 in 1911. Per capita exports were assumed to be approximately 
£14 for the 26-counties in 1911 (taking a 50 per cent price rise as a 
balance between a lower commodity rise for primary products and a 
higher one for manufactured goods), they would amount to £44 million, 
leaving £22.7 million for the north, or £18 per capita .. These figures 
would give percentages of import trade to income of 42 % (£44 million 
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of £105 million) for the Free State, and 51 % (£23 million of £45 million 
for the north}. These calculations , while crude, provide a trade pattern 
which matches the contrasting structure of bank advances/investment in 
the two parts of the island. 
The change in the structure of trade in the 1920s may be only 
apparent. l think I have greatly contributed to the existing optimistic 
assumption about incomes in the 1920s, both because I accepted 
Kiernan's income figure for 1926 and because at an earlier date I 
argued elsewhere that the rise in incomes in the first world war, 
despite subsequent deflation, to some extent did not lose ground and was 
reflected in an enlarged imbalance of trade.45 There probably was some 
rise in the imbalance corresponding to the holding of large cash balances 
and to some redistribution of income from the saving classes to the 
wage earning and urban professional classes, who were by definition 
"high"-spending rather than savini;i classes. In fact incomes at large 
probably did not on balance rise in real terms. Nor was this rigidity of 
itself uncharacteristic. The longterm profile of per capita incomes is 
probably fitful and bunched in well-defined periods, occurring in the 
1860s and early 1870s and again in the 1890s and first decade. of the 
century. 46 Whether the undoubted rise in and immediately after the 
First World War held its own or, with the distorted swings in relative 
prices, somehow or other was equitably distributed is of course a more 
problematic issue. On balance, netting out a rise in 1915-1920 and 
some reversal thereafter, probably little change occurred between the 
early191 Os and 1948, even if cheaper and novel consumer goods in the 
1920s altered appearances somewhat; change at that time was most 
evident for wage earners and professionals in the towns, and the 
salaried and clerical workers of the service sector. The farming 
community probably did not do well, even if the institutional devices of 
land reform which ensured that inflation eroded the real cost of rents and 
annuities alike greatly softened the impact and transferred a large part 
of the burthen to the landowning class who were the real losers (and 
whose plight of itself was of course necessarily somewhat deflationary 
in its impact on rural and small town life). 
VI 
The rise in per capita trade was sharp in the nineteenth century. By 1911 
per capita growth rates of trade from the 1830s were comparable with 
some of the most favourable instances (a s...even-fold rise compared with 
Bairoch's six-fold average for Europe).41 However, there are some 
qualifications to make. Rates of total trade grew less rapidly: as incomes 
were competitive and labour plentiful, Ireland should have been able to 
do even better, unless one could argue full employment or shortage of 
other factors of production such as capital. Given the presence of surplus 
labour (as witnessed in Ireland's migration, near-unique for the century) 
and an emergence of a capital surplus (consecrated by a mature economic 
structure from the end of the 1870s) , if trade grew rapidly, the question 
arises why it did not rise even more rapidly. In other words, either costs 
were for some reason uncompetitive or the export composition was 
unhelpful ( or if one chose to so - though personally I regard the argument 
simply as one which marks historians' being at a loss to explain a 
complex phenomenon and hence, grasping like a drowning man at a straw · 
speculate that there was widespread entrepreneuriaf failure running 
through the entire economy). 
The export pattern itself seems to have been unfavourable or unstable. If 
we take the four main categories, the structure was shifting: grain 
featured heavily in 1792 and 1835; the composition of pastoral products 
shifted variously in its emphasis on beef, livestock or butter, and 
shipbuilding was important only in 1911. 48 Linen was prominent 
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throughout, but it was a poor textile, providing the lowest income among 
textiles and employing the highest proportion of women and children 
among textiles in the United Kingdom. In other words, large though the 
export trade was ,it was a fragile one. Perhaps for this reason, export 
units tended to be large, often integrated in the textile industries. 
Portlaw , Dublin, Limerick and Belfast variously had industrial plant 
which at one time or other were among the largest in the world. Just as 
its grain export trade, prior to repeal of the corn laws in 1846, depended 
on high yields, cheap labour and expensive kiln-drying in remarkably 
large and newly-built mills, its pastoral farming produced a complex 
pattern of movement of calves from dairying districts to feeding 
districts, and of youn~ livestock from them in turn to finishing lands. 
Just as arable cultivation provided meagre returns to the labourers and 
colliers who grew the essential root crop - potatoes - in heavy cropping 
rotations and provided the cheap labour which made the system 
possible, the livestock system was not equitable in its returns as 
between the interests within it. Superficially complex and 
sophisticated, it provided extremely low returns to many of the 
individual producers, locked into a system in which the benefits were not 
distributed equally , and which was conducted on very heavy working 
capital requirements from the banking system and yielded handsome 
returns to the jobbers or traders. It was an exploitive system to start 
with, and performed better in the nineteeenth century only in the sense 
that a larger turnover of cattle, with the rise of live cattle exports, 
redistributed in the second half of the century some of the benefits back 
to the sellers of calves and feeders of livestock in their first year. This 
redistribution of income within the trade added to the working capital 
demands but it itself perpetuated a structure whose intricacy depended 
more on the readiness or necessity of many farmers to work for very 
small returns. The Irish system brought even marginal lands into the 
market system, but in a sense its more fragile links were the counterpart 
of the vital role of the labourer/collier in the expanding cereal husbandry 
of the period from the 1760s to the 1840s. 
VII 
One of Prof. 0 Grada's reasons recently for doubts about an estimate of 
£150 million is that pitching income at such a level, compared with 
later years, would J10t allow for the income growth which occurred in 
the first world war.48 I have already referred to the problems in that , 
and to my own probable role as one of the culprits. In fact what occurred 
in the first world war is complex. Wages and salaries certainly gained on 
balance (something that can be seen interestingly within the data of 
individual large firms - take Easons with which I am familiar for 
instance). However other gains were less clearcut. Farmers' 
circumstances in particular were complex. Savings were large: the 
system was awash with liquidity and larger farmers held dramatically 
large cash balances in the 1920s. Their business income can not have 
improved on balance, as commodity price trends did not advantage them. 
On the other the static character of cash outgoings on foot of rent (frozen in many surviving cases from or two past statutory court 
decisions) or even lower annuities ( which replaced statutory rents on 
land sold to the occupiers) meant that they were on that front 
beneficiaries of the war and postwar inflation. Their cash outgoings on 
foot of annuities or rent of a mere £6.00 million in 1926 compared with 
£8.4 before the war. As gross farm output had risen from £45 million 
to £80 million, they had not only fallen in absolute terms but even more 
sharply, from 19 per cent to 7 1 /2 per cent, as a proportion of total 
output. A combination of falling charges, and an increased income from 
investment and bank deposits, gave them a cushion. If labourer and 
farmer income are aggref}ated , the rural community, if we restrict it to 
farmers and labourers, did not lose out greatly. They did not of course 
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gain greatly: food patterns reverted to old ones, radio, newsprint and 
personal mobility were slow to advance (the new consumer durables of 
the 1920s were taken up by townmen and rural higher professionals who 
could afford them ). The pattern is more gloomy il the income of the 
entire rural community is taken. The income of landowners fell further as 
rents were turned into annuities, and as the purchasing power of 
surviving rents and of the land bonds which up to 1917 had replaced them 
was decimated by inflation. In this sense a comparison between the 
1920s and pre-war decades gives a less reassuring picture. The aggregate 
income of the countryside (il we include three classes) evolved much 
less favourably. 
In comparin~ income it is important to provide an accurate measure of 
the economic aspects of the rural reforms. Unless we monetise the 
benefits of farmers by putting a cash price in some form on the new 
rights acquired by farmers, the outcome of the reform are minimised in 
the sense that the reforms would seem to have conferred little 
advantage on the farming community. If we do not include an element 
attributing a monetary recognition to security of tenure and house 
occupation, moreover, the position of labourer and small farmer is 
identical. Their cash income in the extreme example is identical: 
however, the labourer had to pay a cash rent for his house (or bore a 
cash deduction from his wage); the small farmer made no cash payment 
for his - usually larger - house. 
One consequence of this failure is that in the short term the arguments 
about the economic damage allegedly caused by land reform seem more 
impressive than they actually are. The economic basis for the new 
dynamism of the countryside before the First World War, its politics, 
sports and Gaelic League, all bicycle-assisted and recorded by the rural 
camera, is unappreciated: new consumer goods reached the hands of the 
rural classes in a way they had not in the past and did not anew in the 
1920s. In the longer term the continuing effect of the reform in 
softening the impact of adverse external events on farmers in the 1920s 
has to be borne in mind. In other words, national income has to be 
calculated on two bases as far as the conceptual framework is concerned: 
the first as has broadly speaking been done from the 1920s, the second 
constructed to reflect the benefits and losses in and through the 
process of land reform. The losses were borne less by farmers than by 
the landed class and this shift, already evident, was more so in the 
1920s. It was reflected in the material condition of the landed class. 
The decline in their prosperity and even in their numbers entailed no 
doubt a loss for some professions as well, butlers and house maids for 
instance and the service sector of the small towns and villages, and 
may in some way be related to the phenomenon of the replacement to 
some extent of the protestant business class of small towns by 
catholics, a process already well under way before the first world war. 
Ironically of course, that development combined two contrasting 
scenarios , a loss of opportunity and an increased mobility of 
protestants, and on the other hand increased local opportunities for 
catholics. There is much here to be comprehended, both at the level of the 
experience of the individual family and of the aggregates. Part of the 
story is the continued - accelerating - decline of the big house, its lack 
of occupancy, a turnover of owners and in many cases where owners did 
not abandon it, a succession of temporary occupiers renting house and 
demesne. The phenomenon was not unique to Ireland: it is paralleled in 
England in cases where landowers did not own urban property or enjoy 
mining royalties. The key point is that, unless we understand this 
situation and construct the aggregates correctly, the stagnation of rural 
income will exaggerate the precarious dimension of the surviving 
classes of the countryside. The costs were borne by the landed classes. In 
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their case, though they had been once the lords of the countryside 
literally and figuratively , incomes had already shrunk before the first 
world war, and the reduced incomes were roughly halved in purchasing 
power over the next decade. Moreover, as recipients of fixed incomes, 
they were particularly losers during the inflation itself: inflation even if 
it was replaced by deflation after 1920, had in the intervening years 
from 1915 to 1920 added to their emerging indebtedness and accelerated 
the process of losing their economic as well as social place in the life of 
the countryside . It was in the 1920s that the term Big House, known but 
never used in literary terms and little in real life, was popularised as a 
literary expression of nostalgia. Rural society through this process had 
become at least in economc terms more more egaritarian. While it does 
not have great significance for later decades, great care has to be taken 
between the 1880s and 1920s in, on one hand, putting a monetary price 
on the benefits of enhanced house and farm occupation, and on the other 
hand, taking careful account of two key cash outgoings, rents and the 
interest component of annuities. 
V 111 
A final concluding comment is worthwhile on methodology. The methods 
of the 1911 calculation can be applied to earlier years. If we disregard 
the absence of census of industrial production, the handicap is not 
serious and the methods homogeneous: agricultural income, industrial 
incomes, and other earnings can be aggregated. With further work this 
can be bettered, though the problem of discriminating between buyers and 
makers, and employers and employees in the census can not be 
overcome. Broadly speaking the problems in handling the 1881-1911 
censuses are similar; 1867-1871 (and to some extent 1851) would 
present some problems of their own; 1841 presents quite distinct 
problems compared with later censuses; and the use of the 1831 and 
1821 censuses would be much cruder. Two problems become particularly 
important as we precede backwardss: the absence of income tax date 
before 1854 (ignoring the question of three shifts in the threshold: £100 
in 1854 , £150 in 1874 and finally £160 in 1894), and the absence of 
agricultural statistics before 1847. The absence of foreign trade data 
between 1826-1903 is not as serious as it appears, because many 
individual series exist (quite apart from Solar's excellent work in 
makin(J up the gaps). From roughly mid-century, the runs of agricultural 
statistics and income tax returns would make it possible to calculate 
adjusted figures of some authority for income in the intervening years of 
each decade between the benchmark census years. The essential 
question is not the possibility of making estimates but how far it is 
worth going in refining the estimates of wages and employment: at what 
point i do diminishing returns set in? 
The data readly available in serial form cover tax charged only, in 
1854-1865. The amounts of income are given for later years, either 
gross or net, and where amounts do not exist, or only net yields are 
readily available, the necessary figures may be obtainable in further 
work in either parliamentary or mansucript sources. Income for non- land 
sources - available in a single omnibus category for these years at any 
rate in summary returns - rose remarkably rapidly in 1865-67, 
testifying to a boom which did not come to an end till after 1873( 
assesment years, referring to previous year's income). Section D income 
did not recover its 1876 level till 1891 ( with two intervening troughs 
in 1882 and 1887) . It peaked in 1894, but the downturn in the following 
years is in part a result of change in the threshold in 1894. A severe 
downturn is evident only in 1901-1905, to be replaced by a remarkably 
sharp upturn in 1906-1912. What is particularly interesting for both the 
1890s and 191 Os is the rise in schedule E taxpayers' income in the 
1890s but more particularly in the first decade, a rise of 50 per cent 
14 
over the two decades. As it includes officials in public companies, the 
data point to a new and novel strengthening of the corporate sector. In 
general the evolution of the economy was quite strong in the 1890s and 
1900s. They are a highwater mark in some respects, one exceeded in the 
urban milieu of clerical employees in the 1920s and of business in the 
1930s, but otherwise not widely diffused in quite the same broad way as 
in this period for almost another generation. The phenomenon is evident 
even in a physical sense in house building , and in the enlargement of both 
Belfast and Dublin. The way in which this is underestimated is strikingly 
evident in the persistence in choosing to look at Dublin as a city of 
300,000 citizens with a deep sump of poverty at the centre , whereas if 
we look at the city as an urban agglomeration rather than a product of 
outdated boundaries, it was a city of 400,000 with an impressive and 
almost uninterupted pattern into the new century of new building for the 
upper-middle and clerical classes. The comfortable artizans 
complemented them, and even the slums contracted in size somewhat, and 
in colonising better but now socially decaying central districts in some 
respects had improved their lot compared with the less favourable 
circumstances which they left in the 1860s and subsequent decades. 
Health statistics, slow to show improvement before the late nineteenth 
century compared with British cities, offer a parallel trend. 
The dilemma is not the aggregates, though the reluctance to envisage 
them as in any way moderately favourable, is persistent, but distribution 
within the aggregates. Irish incomes were unequally distributed, in part a 
phenomenon of an English-style inegalitarian favouring of landed society 
in the first instance, in part one of comparatively low agricultural 
incomes, in part one of a sharp divide beween skilled and unskilled 
earnings. In the end, whether we cast Irish income as high as I have 
suggested or lower, we are confronted with the problem of a society less 
endowed with fortune than western Europe at large, or one which is more 
properly a semi-industrial or semi-developed country than a close sharer 
with its richer neighbours. The idea that gaps can be closed by 
institutional devices in the form of Brussels-generated devices or by 
large amounts of cash ( even if they were larger than they are) seems 
doubtful given the persistence in society whether in its internal 
relationships or in its external ones, of inequalities. 
L.M. Cullen 
Trinity College 
Dublin 2 
31 October 1995 
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Appendix 
Gross National product at market prices 1911 
census class I Public service 
Civil service 
do. pensions 
army and navy 
police and local government 
teachers 
clergy 
census class 11 domestic, catering and indoor 
services 
census class 111 Professions and commercial 
services (net of taxpapers 
included in schedule D and E income tax) 
medical and legal services 
not covered by schedule D 
commercial services 
transport 
surveyors and architects 
pertormers 
census class IV Agriculture 
agricultural occupations not 
included in census of agricultural 
output 
agricultural income 
distributed as: 
2,181,187 1 
100,000 2 
1,859,8503 
1,908,234 4 
1,971.149 5 
1,610,234 6 
4,670,094 7 
364,291 8 
4,250,7359 
4,435,648 10 
392,55011 
41,200 12 
689,320 13 
rents to residents: 
do non-residents 
2 
4.40 million 
1.30 14 
income of farmers and labourers 
net of rent, and including 
turf (£3 million) 15 
total 
less annuities interest 
rates, other interest, machinery 
total 
imputed income of house and 
land occupancy 
grand total : 51,840,ooo17 
less rents to absentees 1,300,000 
5.70 
45.84 
2.7 
2.50 
5.20 
5.5016 
CLASS V Commercial and industrial occupations 
Miscellaneous income 6,000,00018 
Activities not covered 
by census of industrial output 4,365,73819 
census of industrial output 23,000,00020 
quarries and building not 
covered by census 667,02421 
less expenses 4,000,000 
50,540,00017 
Total 30,032,762 
Income calculated from other sources (i.e.income tax returns) 
other professions and business (schedule D) 
excluding income already covered £6, 141,57222 
other concerns (markets, tolls etc) 
house income net 
Other income imputed and estimated 
remittances 
old age pensions(net) 
investment income 
173,03723 
5, 123,26624 
2, 180,00025 
1,000,00026 
foreign income (including foreign and colonial 
government stocks and profits from outside 
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the British Isles) 1,693,38427 
imputed investment income from British stocks 
and government securities 1,706,61628 
total 
less interest and profits remitted abroad 
(£ 1.5 million ) 
Adjustments 
3,400,000 
adjustment to census category 5 and Census of 
industrial output for rise in prices 
omissions and underestimation 
inventories of export firms, earnings of commodity handlers, 
and unrepatriated and unrecorded profits in export trade 
inventories and profits in imports and wholesaling of 
imports 
interest and rents received and not included in tax returns 
estimated figure for rise in output from 1907 /8 
( Agriculture and industry: not taken into account) 
NOTES 
1. Schedule E taxpayers (total 2293), £944,887; other officials, total 
3,400,00029 
ni130 
6,250,00031 
6,500, 00032 
1,500,00033 
1 , 500, 00034 
500,00035 
nil36 
139,315,129 
8030, at £100 p.a., and total 8667 at £50 p.a. Much government 
expenditure, mainly salary and allowances, can be accounted for directly 
(though without details of the number of employees) and serves as a 
useful backup support to the calculations. However,as Post Office, Excise 
and Revenue Commissioners outlay on salaries was not readily available, 
an imputed figure based on census categories is unavoidable. 
2. Superannuation and allowances in parliamentary papers at £73,000 
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rounded up. 
3. 2208 army officers at an estimated £200 p.a.,plus estimated rank and 
file. No compensating deduction from total number of occupations paying 
schedule E taxation is made as tax may have been accounted for in London. 
The income estimate is not far short of total pay for army and medical 
services, calculated as Irish share of manpower. Income in kind is not 
calculated and underlines the fact that further deductions are not 
warranted. 
4. Of which police (DMP and RIG) £1,450,234 including 
allowances.pensions, and clothing. Doublecounting of the small number of 
income-tax paying offices is accounted for indirectly through deductions 
elsewhere from Schedule E salaries. 
5. 12700 plus primary teachers (1909 figure) at an appropriation of 
£1,450,234 for 1911/12. A balance of almost 10,000 teachers is given 
£50 each, making a total of £500,000. This is an underestimate, as, though 
many salaries fell short of national school salaries, it ignores higher 
salaries and the profits of private schools. 
6. 6581 clergy @ £200. They are not included for tax purposes as the 
miscelleaneous structure of income seemed to warrant a conclusion that 
income was not taxed. Some clergy would have been included among 
income tax payers under schedule E or D . In particular, some Church of 
Ireland clerical income, where a landed background or marriage arises , is 
covered in investment and schedule D and E income (probate returns are 
relevant on this point). A total of 11,309 other religious are given an 
income of £294,034. The 1262 clerical students were given no income, 
though many (but not all) received gratuitous board and lodging , for 
which the maximum total cost would be approx. £40,000. Income of the 
catholic clergy is heavily underestimated in this calculation. The income 
of parish priests was as high as £400-£500 in 1900, and of curates 
about £300. See L. Bane, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, TCD 1994. Perhaps 
£500,000 represents underestimated catholic clergy income , and as 
much again unrecorded or untaxed income from other clergy. 
7. Variously estimated at 1 Os., 15s and £1 a week (the latter only for 1638 
non-nursing personnel in hospitals and institutions). The largest 
component is 125,783 female indoor servants. Income was estimated at 
5s. and board and lodgings at 5s. These calculates are confirmed in Monica 
Hearn, "Domestic service in Ireland 1880-1920", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
TCD1984, pp. 87-8, 93-4, and are if anything on the low side. This would 
serve to compensate for undereremployment in the category. Cameron's 
book on the poor in Dublin in 1904 has also relevant miscellaneous figures. 
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8. 5314 barristers, solicitors and doctors are assumed covered by 
schedule D returns. This involves some underestimation of income as not 
all participants earned enough to come within the tax net. The £364,291 
consists of the income of 9046 support clerical and paramedical 
personnel, variously at £25, £26, £75 p.a, and 15/- per week. 
9. Schedule E corporation and public company offices, taxed income of 
£3,685,476 reduced to £2,140,639; some employments were excluded in 
advance , and for the remaining balance a deduction of £78 was made per 
head to ensure that income was not double counted (i.e. that their tax 
income and a figure of c.£78 per head in respect of occupation groupings 
within the census were not both included in the final calculations). If 
done afresh, these calculations could be executed on a different basis. The 
effect on overall national income would be slight but it could yield a 
somewhat more even distribution between subdivisions. Schedule E 
public bodies (Bank of Ireland, Port and Docks Board, RCB, Irish Lights etc) 
employee income of £519,446 is including with matching deductions 
elsewhere to avoid doublecounting. Other incomes included are bank 
clerical incomes for personnel not covered by tax( total 1000 persons) at 
an estimated income of £100,000 and insurance ( total 2728 persons ) 
£272,800; commercial travellers, clerks ,salesmen and buyers ( total 
16,238 persons) at £75 p.a., £1,217,850. 
10. Schedule D railways £1,797,698; 
canals and docks £223,206; 
railway employees, 13,040 at £60, £78,000 (earnings of 20,392 "railway 
servants", a wider category, estimated at 20s.9 3/4d in P.P. 1912.13, 
xcii); 
road transport: 4335 at £52 (£225,420) plus carters and cabmen ( 17, 153) 
@ 15s. per week (£668,934); 
rivers and canals, 6153 at £52 p.a. (£319,956); 
sea (8147) at £50 plus £10 in kind p.a. (£510,290); 
pilots 232 at £52 (£12,064). 
11. @ £50 and £100. 
12. @ £50 
13. 8538 fisherman at 1 Os per week,, others ( total 538) @ £25 and £52 
p.a., and 15s a week. 4068 cattle, sheep, pig dealers and sales masters 
were given an income of £78. Given the scale of internal and export trade, 
this is a serious underestimate, and much income would have been higher 
and probably also escaped the tax net 
14. Rents and annuities are adjustments of published figures. The 
estimate of absentee rents is 21 per cent, from The Irish landowners 
Convention, fourth report, 1889. This is certainly an underestimate, 
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excluding incomes of institutional absentees and probably 
underestimating at large. 
15. The only estimate for turf is for 1918 in which output was valued at 
£6 million. For 1911 the value is taken as half of that figure. O'Connor and 
Guiomard using estimates of turf output from the 1920s, give a figure of 
£3.3 million for the value of turf in the Free State in 1912/3, confirming 
broadly the estimate used in the text. See R. O'Connor and C. Guiomard, 
"Agricultural output in the Irish Free State area before and after 
independence", Irish economic and social history, vol. xii(1985), pp.89-97. 
16. Imputed income of ownership plus house occupancy. Changes in rents 
need taking into account: otherwise changing circumstances of farmers are 
not mirrored in calculations of income: if rents are being reduced, 
identical calculations of output would reflect no change in farmers 
circumstances, though the fall in schedule A assessments was matched by 
a transfer of property rights to tenants. In addition, the income tax returns 
make clear that occupier-owner houses in the countryside were included 
elsewhere and only tenanted houses in rural areas were included in 
schedule A. The figures do not seem to include an effective monetisation of 
farm house occupancy: to compare urban and rural incomes and labourer and 
farmer incomes this is vital, as urban dwellers and labourers' effective 
incomes (and those of rural professionals) were reduced by cash rents. 
Strictly speaking, buildings in Ireland were tenant's property to a much 
greater extent than in England, counterbalanced by the fact that security of 
tenure was, contrary to what is widely believed, much greater in Ireland . 
Precisely because they had rented the buildings as well as the land, English 
tenants could be mobile; Irish tenants had a large stake by investment, and 
hence economic as well as legal circumstances made them less mobile. The 
full implications of the valuation require a closer look: it is not clear that 
the schedule A assessments give due weight to house occupancy as opposed 
to the valuation of land. The most dramatic illustration of this can be seen 
in the steady reduction of the total for schedule A: if house valuation were 
a significant element, the valuation could not have fallen so much. From 
the perspective of taxing the imputed income of occupancy the figures are 
virtually meaningless. 
The farmer's interest in ownership as opposed to occupation and its profits 
is also a very difficult subject, both because it raises inherently 
complex issues and because changes in the structure of land ownership 
affected matters. If it is not faced however, several serious consequences 
arise. Agricultural incomes will seem paradoxically to have fallen with 
land reform, whereas of course land reform directly benefitted the farmer. 
In other words, as enhanced ownership conferred benefits, the results 
have to be monetised, or we create an illogical situation in which the most 
obvous result of the land reform is that it reduced the monetised value of 
ownership. Likewise, if the income is not fully taken into account, the way 
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in which fixed rents and their later replacement annuities permanently 
benefitted farmers is overlooked, and estimates of income in the 1920s 
compared with pre-1914 years become more pessimistic than 
circumstances warrant. Although, it is not a major concern of this paper, 
the changes in the farmer's interest in land must be monetised in some 
way for purposes of national income estimates if we are going to 
meaningfully compare both his circumstancs at any point of time with the 
two other categories of the countryside.labourers and landlords, and 
changes over time within each category of rural income earner. This 
problem has not been adequately addressed in the literature, even when 
some of the problems are confronted as in Kiernan's pioneering calculation. 
The farmer's interest is taken to be £5.5 million in 1911 (£3.00 million in 
net reduction in rents and in the margin between annuities and existing, 
usually statutorily reduced, rents, plus say £0.5 million as the capital 
component of annuities payments, conferring an enhanced ownership 
interest, and an arbitrary figure of £2,000,000 for underestimated 
occupancy interest in domestic dwellings). In 1911 farmers paid £5.7 
million in cash rents; they also paid an interest component in annuities 
estimated crudely at£ 2.7 million. Farmers in 1926 paid £2 million in cash 
rents and had an imputed income from land ownership of £9 million 
represented by £1 million in annuities , £ 5 million in the cumulative 
reductions in rents and the reduction element in annuities, and at least 
£3 million in the imputed value of house occupancy. Actual cash payments 
(rents plus the interest component of annuities) by farmers in 1911 were 
£8.4 milion and in 1926 £6.00 million. As inflation in the interval was of 
the order of 80 per cent, the fall in cash outlay was dramatic. Figures for 
the Free State are readily available; they are less so for Northern Ireland, 
and further work is necessary to refine the precise figures, athough it 
should not make much difference to the estimates. 
17. Based on 1908 census of output: price and volume rises between 1908 
and 1911 are unallowed for (though the price rise is included in an 
addition under Adjustments (see below note 31 ). The summary figures 
available for the unpublished 1912 census give a much higher figure for 
gross output. They would , using similar adjustments, give a 
correspondingly higher figure for net income. 
18. The total consists of 139,883 variously remunerated at 15s, £1 and 
£1.50 per week (i.e. census of industrial output net average of £78). 
19. This total relates to miscellaneous and rather vague categories for 
which the estimates are crudely made : 
makers and dealers( total 28921) @ £1 (£1,503,892); 
mechanics and artisans ( total 2224) @£ I per week (£115,648); 
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apprentices and assistants ( total 955) at £26 per annum ( £24,830); 
labourers ( total 70,000) assumed non-agricultural (the balance of 78,770 
labourers assumed to be agricultural), and given 15s per week 
(£2,721,368). 
There is underemployment in the labourer category. On the other hand, as 
it is an urban category, and the weekly figure of 15s. is low, the low wage 
tends to balance out the underemployment angle. 
20. Expenses are estimated at £ 3 million for firms in the census of 
industrial output, and at £1 million for other firms (low because often 
conducted in the home etc). and are deducted from the gross figure for 
Class V. Wear and tear was calculated by the revenue at £742,000. The 
balance is assumed to be rent, interest, and equipment purchases beyond 
depreciation needs. 
A crude calculation would suggest 270,000 wage earners at an average 
of say£ 52 (£14 million), 17 ,OOO salaried workers at say £75 ( £1.3 
million ) plus say £1 million for both higher and taxed salaries. With an 
addition of £1.8 million for taxed profits (See note 22) and £0.9 million 
for either undeclared profits or profits outside the collecting network, 
this comes to £ 19.0 million. The difference between this total (£19 
million ) and the net output of £24 million would be distributed 
between expenses, suggested as £3 million, and an unallocated residue of 
£2 million which is not taken into account, and which could on certain 
conditions be allocated either as further underestimated income (which 
would raise national income further), or as an addition to expenses (which 
would reduce total income). In practice in a year of rising activity 
realised profits, if increased stocks are included, are likely to have 
exceeded calculations of net returns. Given also the likelihood of large 
non-recording of profits for tax purposes, profits declared for tax 
purposes should be estimated conservatively and there should probably 
be a significant addition to total profits. In addition, profits for tax 
purposes are also likely to have been kept down as a result of the fact that 
as some large companies (notably both Guinness and breweries at large in 
fact have a disproportionate place in the calculations of net industrial 
output) were incorporated in Britain, and their tax profits would be 
recorded through British , not Irish, assessments. 
21. Based on the excess of the occupational category in the population 
census over employment in the census of industrial output, multiplied by 
the corresponding net output per employee for each category. 
22. The income in the gross revenue return was £12,015,000, consisting 
of: 
individual persons 4,646, 571 ( total 18,327, of whom 2406 were 
employees with an income of £497,896); 
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firms £1, 316599 ( total 1508); 
public companies and corporations 5,886,896 ( total 1430); 
local authorities £165,258 ( total 27). 
Of the income of £7183495 for individuals (net of employee income) and 
for firms, deduct one quarter as income covered by the census of 
industrial output. This total is £1,795,871, and seems highly plausible as 
an estimated profit proportion of the residual element in the census of 
industrial output. A higher figure say a third could be used , but if so it 
would make little allowance for the fact that much output would not have 
been returned or overlooked for tax purposes. 
The balance of £5,287,613 of the £7,183,495 represents profits of 
non-industrial firms and companies other than transport concerns. The 
income of persons (i.e. in effect one-person firms.self employed persons 
and employees) is £4,646,571 in the gross revenue return. Of this only 
13/61ths remains to take into account, as the rest corresponds to census 
occupations excluded from the GNP calculations as likely to have paid 
income tax. This fraction, 13/61, leaves a residue of £990,249. However 
it is likely that these occupations, which have not been expressly excluded 
from the calculations, are covered by estimates elsewhere of income are 
various rates, mostly not exceeding £78. If £301,548 is excluded to match 
3866 jobs for a remuneration calculation of £78 per job, there is a 
residue of £688,701. 
The final total to take into account out of the £12 million, adding local 
authority income, is therefore £6,141,572. 
23. From schedule D returns 
24. Less deduction of £200,000. 
25. Emigrants' remittances £2 million, migrants earnings £180,000: 
contemporary estimates. 
26. Old age pensions were £2,800,000 in 1911. Ireland was increasingly 
undertaxed by 1911: this compoment of the total is assumed to be that 
paid out of British taxation and hence represents a real or international 
transfer. 
27. Irish share of foreign income of £103,894, 667, taken as 1.63 % of 
the total based on the Irish proportion of comparable items in the 
probate returns for same year. 
28. Derived income. Based on estimated capital value of holdings of 
income-yielding securities and stocks in 1926 reduced by the estimated 
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amount net additions from 1911 to 1926, less government stocks held in 
1911. The income is then calculated at November 1911 consols yield of 
£3.4s % less estimated foreign income accounted for in London. The figure 
is quite a large one. Some of it relates to securities held privately, but 
much of it relates to investment in London especially by Dublin banks and 
the Munster & Leinster in both government stock and short-dated 
securities in London. This investment began to expand from the end of 
1870s.These calculations are in part confirmed by the fact that 
government securities on which interest was paid at the Bank of Ireland 
should have yielded an income of at least £1 , 135,750 in 1911. This 
calculation is based on figures of holdings at the Bank of Ireland, at a rate 
of 2 3/4 %. This is on balance a slight understatement of the income as 
some were above 2 3/4 per cent. It is not clear whether all the income on 
these holdings was paid to residents; most of it was. 
29. The calculation in footnote 28 from the nature of the calculations 
almost certainly underestimates income on Irish investment holdings in 
non-government entitlements in Britain. A figure of less than £600,000 
(£1,706,616 minus £1,135,750) seems low. Assessments of investment 
income were made in London, not in Dublin. 
30. This would have been taxed in the main in London and hence not 
included in assessments issued in Dublin. The figure should be added in 
however in calculating GDP. 
31. Agriculture and Industrial output were calculated in 1908 and 1907 
prices respectively. Hence an adjustment is made on the basis of the 
Sauerbeck price index for the rise in agricultural prices, some 9.5 per cent 
for 1908-1911, amounting on £50 million in 1908 to £4,750,000. For 
industrial prices, the wholesale indexes did not appear satisfactory, and a 
simple average of the food and textile components of the Ministry of 
Labour retail price index, which was felt to be more realistic for the 
purpose, was taken. At 5 per cent for 1907-1911 on a total of £30 million, 
this gave a figure of £1,500,000. While any index adjustment of this sort 
is uncertain, the net adjustment is unlikely to be an underestimate of 
actual increased income in 1911, bearing in mid that output was higher in 
1911. Thus net income returns (i.e. allowing for abatements) in schedule D 
tax were £11,090,927 compared with £9,410,819 in 1907. Linen exports 
for the United Kingdom were 173.6 million yards in 1911, while lower 
than in 1909 and 1910, compared with 165.7 million in 1907. 1911 itself 
would have been a rise of steeply rising production as exports at191.9 
million yards in 1912 were only marginally below the record figures of 
1909 and 1910. The price of cloth in 1911 was also the highest for 
almost 30 years. 
32. There is a probable underestimation of ecclesiastical income of £1 
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million, and school teacher income £500,000, ignoring small 
underestimates elsewhere. Moreover, reliance on taxation returns amounts 
to a considerable underestimation of income. Incomes of schedule D 
employees themselves were few ( total 2406 compared with a total of 
21179 schedule E employees in the public sector and corporations). While 
this might suggest evasion it is not as serious as it sounds at first sight 
as most clerical incomes were well below income tax levels. A firm like 
Eason's in 1911 would have had only 10-12 employees at income tax levels. 
What is highly unlikely however is that there only 14,413 one-man firms 
(18327 tax payers less 2406 and 1508 taxpayers in other categories) 
paying schedule D. It would be easy to assume that as many again, roughly 
20,000 should have paid tax. If one assumed that they earned £300 on 
average, allowing for £78 per head for income included in calculation s 
already made of census categories, they would net £4,440,000. The 
problem is not primarily one of evasion, thought that existed. It is simply 
that Irish incomes bunched at the bottom, and both tax payers and tax 
gatherers were in the early stages of respectively accepting and 
administering income tax on lower reaches of income. Of the 33,375 tax 
payers accorded abatements 28,600 were in the bottom range of income, 
£160 to £400. These estimates are not therefore wild. The overall figure 
would be £6 million, to which £0.5 million is added for the taxable income 
of companies incorporated in England but not remitted out of Ireland. 
33. Foreign trade per capita in 1911 averaged a total of £30 , one of the 
highest figures in the world ( and in this year evenly spread between 
exports and imports. The profits realised in a high export income of £14 
per capita, given the size of the exporting sector, must have yielded large 
profits within the country , gains in inventories, and unrepatriated 
profits. Given the prominence of one-man firms in marketing and 
services, there would be the fact of unrecorded income. An notional 
figure of £1.5 million is included. 
34. The same considerations as in note 33 apply to imports. There was a 
very large import sector to handle what was per capita one of the largest 
import trades in the world, significantly higher than that of the United 
Kindgom (though at higher costs, given a scattered and rural population). 
Easons which dealt mainly in imports is an interesting illustration of 
profits. Although many of its activities were low return activities, per 
capita net profits in the late years of the first decade were as high as £30 
per employee and the net dividend was £15 per employee. Confined to the 
firm's high grade activities ( which reflect the fact that others were 
much Jes profitable or even losing ), returns were as high as £50 per head. 
Given the diffuse character of the distributive sector and the small scale 
of many operators within it, this is significant. Much of the profits would 
of course be the normal ones of rendering services, but import activity 
with its elements of monopoly and inventory gains had fluctuating 
12 
prospects of profit (and some corresponding losses, with the result that 
in individual years this could reduce as well as raise income). Hence , a 
notional figure of £1.5 million is included. 
35. A miscellaneous estimate to catch various cash income not caught in 
the tax net. 
36. Only aggregates of total output were available in British publications 
in the 1920s, for the industrial and agricultural censuses, of 1912, when 
this calculation was made in 197 4: the detail was too slight to admit of 
use. They were not published because the war intervened. 
